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Abstract: The related notions of habitation and habitability offer a very promising way for framing the conversation 
about the issues around which environmental political theory has gravitated from its inception: sustainability, 
environmental justice, preservation. However, the connection between the two must probably be revised in order to 
produce an ideal of habitation that is useful in the current sociopolitical context. This paper seeks to clarify their 
mutual relations and explores the way for the politicization of habitation. Underlining the role of nonintentional 
actions in the past history of habitation, it will argue that, in order to politicize habitation, the latter must be made 
salient -so that citizens realize that the socionatural relation is not that 'natural'. Ernesto Laclau's notion of the 
political as an uncovering of contingencies may be useful, while the Lacanian notion of fantasy may be used to 
explain the gap between current (instrumental) modes of habitation and pervasive (Arcadian) ideals of it. As to how 
can the relation between habitation and habitability be effectively politicized, this paper will argue that it is the 
political, rather than politics, what offers a most promising path for re-imagining habitation in our complex and 
ambivalent societies. Ecological citizenship and newly created spaces for nature are sketched as strategies for 
politicizing habitation. Bioregionalism is recovered as a radical politics of habitation whose flaws must be avoided if 
habitation is to be reframed in a mostly urban, hypertechnological world. In this regard, the paper also develops a 
particular narrative for a reframed habitation, a 'clever adaptation' understood as a regulatory ideal towards which 
different actions and discourses can be directed. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
Arguably, the related notions of habitation and habitability -as well as the interplay between them- offer a 
very promising way for framing the conversation about the issues around which environmental political 
theory has gravitated from its inception: sustainability, environmental justice, preservation. This is 
especially the case now that the Anthropocene hypothesis has gained ground and we are in need of 
theoretical concepts that are truly interdisciplinar, not just making possible but actually demanding a 
mixed approach that combines the natural and the social sciences, the descriptive and the prescriptive. 
However, the connection between habitation and habitability must be reviewed in order to produce an 
ideal of habitation that is bith desirable and feasible. This paper will work upon these concepts, seeking to 
clarify their mutual relations and exploring the way in which habitation can be politicized -a precondition 
for its re-orientation in a more just and sustainable fashion. 
 
To such end, I will begin by questioning that habitation can be so easily linked to social decisions about 
how to live, i.e. conscious decisions on how to inhabit a particular environment. As evolutionary theory 
suggest, it is difficult to distinguish between intentional and nonintentional acts of habitation, as the 
human adaptation to the environment -which in turns involve adapting the environment to human ends- is 
not so rich in possibilities, nor so amenable to self-conscious decisions. In that regard, to define habitation 
as a community deciding how to inhabit its environment is somewhat misleading. As just noted, there is no 
such thing as a 'moment' of collective decision, but rather a historical process full of unconscious moves 
and nonintentional effects. Instead, we have to trace back socionatural histories in order to understand the 
resulting socio-ecological regimes, thus distinguishing between conscious and spontaneous decisions of 
habitation. Therefore, habitation is a complex product of biology, culture and history -but only up to a 
point can be said to have been humanly 'designed'. Now that a notable degree of reflexivity have been 
culturally achieved, though, habitation may begin to be linked to ideals of the good life and the good 
society, and thus be opened to political intervention. Nevertheless, that community is increasingly global, 
as climate change and other manifestations of the Anthropocene make clear. Therefore, the gains in 
reflexivity are somewhat marred by the burden of existing socionatural conditions. 
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I will argue that politicizing habitation -so that habitability is guaranteed and ideals of environmental 
justice and preservation are realized- requires, to begin with, making habitation salient. This means that 
citizens are to realize that the socionatural relation is not 'natural' in itself and some (not all) of its features 
can be changed. Here, Laclau's notion of the political as an uncovering of contingencies may be useful. 
However, the questions remains as to how can the relation between habitation and habitability be 
effectively politicized. This paper will suggest that a wider, explicit, and encompassing inclusion of 
habitation in the public agenda remains a remote possibility, so that other ways must be found to make this 
question visible. Moreover, as the historical process of habitation shows, there is a limit as to how easily 
can decisions of habitation be coordinated, especially so in the current global context. Politics, understood 
as a concerted collective moment of decision, has limits. In our complex and ambivalent societies, the 
political, rather than politics, offer a more promising path for re-imagining habitation. 
 
In this paper, I would also like to offer a particular narrative for a reframed habitation, understood as a 
regulatory ideal towards which different actions and discourses can be directed -one that may also serve as 
a way to renew environmental justice as an overlapping goal. If human adaptation to the environment, as 
described by evolutionary theories such as niche-construction or historical ecology, can be seen as 
constituting an 'aggressive adaptation' that is (pace anti-essentialist views on the subject) quintaessential to 
the species, there is now clearly a need for moving towards a 'clever readaptation' that might be linked to a 
'clever re-habitation' of not just particular environments but also the whole planet. In this connection, the 
Anthropocene can itself serve as a new framework for reassessing the good society. 
 
Yet it is also important to acknowledge that sufficiency and restraint are not powerful drivers for societal 
change, as they have a very limited public appeal in the age of globalization. Ideas of re-habitation must 
be thus been sexed up, so that new forms of life or, more modestly, new individual preferences can look 
both cool and right. The homo luxus sapiens that we have become with the passing of time, unsustainable 
as it may be, must be convinced that new ideals of habitation are both possible and desirable. Achieving 
greater environmental justice and natural preservation is thus a matter of salience, but also of abundance. 
This means that science and technology must be rehabilitated in the environmental discourse, since it is 
through them that a better match between habitation and habitability can be achieved. 
  
2. Habitation and habitability: a socionatural approach. 
 
Ever since the green movement succedeed in introducing the environmental question in the public agenda, 
different concepts have been used to frame the conversation about it. However, the underlying assumption 
has not changed much: as the human colonization of the natural world has increased, the planet is taken to 
be reaching its limits -now rephrased as "planetary boundaries" (Röckstrom 2008). Thus a reorganization 
of the socionatural relations is urgent if humanity is to avoid major ecological disruptions. Ideally, this 
correction should be accompanied by a greater protection of natural beings and forms. Admittedly, there is 
no necessary connection between these two goals, but such preservation is encouraged in order to respect 
nature's intrinsic value and to mend the spiritual relationship between human beings and the non-human 
world. In the late 80's, sustainability was firmly established as the notion around which these different 
perspectives on the socionatural relation could revolve. 
 
Some decades later, the debate has grown and expanded in many different directions. Climate change has 
risen as the most prominent of all environmental problems in the public awareness, while at the same time 
has been recently reframed as one of the several manifestations of a wider, more encompassing 
phenomenon: the Anthropocene (see Arias-Maldonado 2015). At the same time, we are becoming more 
attentive to the myriad ways in which human societies and natural systems are embedded into each other. 
As a result, notions such as hybridity and cultivated capital are gaining ground over those that portray a 
separatedness between the social and the natural that does not quite exist anymore. Yet despite some 
weariness that can be explained as user's fatigue, sustainability remains an unsurpassed notion as far as the 
environmental debate is concerned, thanks to its ability to encompass different aspect of the multi-layered, 
endlessly complex socionatural relation. But that does not mean that it cannot be supplemented by other 
categories. It probably must, lest the debate becomes stalled. 
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In this connection, another way of conceptualizing sustainability in the Anthropocene is the distinction -
but also relation- between habitation and habitability (see Lantrip 1997). Whereas habitation refers to the 
way a community makes use of its environment in order to support its way of life, habitability designates 
the match or mis-match between them. However, it should be emphasized that the latter is not an 
uncontested concept that reflects a pre-fixed relation between a given society and its natural environment. 
Despite the demands to respect it, humans do not possess a 'natural' way of life. On the contrary, they have 
culturally developed a number of alternatives that are expressed in different patterns of habitability -in 
turn shaped by ideals of habitation. It could even be said that humanity's way of being as an species 
contradicts the very idea that there is a natural 'match' between a society and its environment. Likewise, 
not every 'match' is feasible: a society can try to realize a given ideal of habitation, only to find that it 
undermines habitability: ecological collapse can follow (see Diamond 2006). Interestingly, local 
habitation can be seemingly viable, while the aggregate effect of several local or national communities can 
lead to patterns of global un-habitability. This is the case with climate change, the quintaessential 
Anthropocenic phenomenon. Now that human habitation has transformed the whole planet, a thorough 
survey of the cumulative effects of our prevalent way of living must be taken into account at every level -
local, national, regional, global- in order to inform the debate about sustainability. 
 
That said, the dichotomy habitation/habitability seems specially well-suited to deal with local or regional, 
rather than continental or global, debates. And such is precisely its value, when we try to answer the 
question as to what does this paired concepts add to the sustainability debate. But it not just that. They 
may also serve to elucidate the role of cultural ideals in shaping -or concealing- the social relation with the 
environment. Additionally, exploring the relation between habitation and habitability is a helpful way of 
reflecting upon the factors that determine human ways of habitation: what is cultural, what is natural, what 
is decided upon, what is done but not decided -and so forth. A major paradox emerges from this reflection, 
namely, that habitation is neither natural not purely social. Rather it is a combination of both natural (but 
not exactly pre-fixed) and social factors -whose historical development, however, gradually increases the 
human ability to make conscious decisions about how to inhabit its environment. 
 
A socionatural approach thus seems appropriate in order to shed light on the relation between habitation 
and habitability. By that I mean an approach that pays attention to the singularity of the human species and 
its adaptive ways, while at the same time acknowledges that the resulting relationship between humanity 
and nature changes over time, so that human beings and nature change as well. Goethe, the German poet, 
was acutely aware of this, as he cautioned that the nature that we face “is not nature anymore, but a 
completely different entity than the one ancient Greeks had been occupied with” (Goethe 2006: 15). But it 
is not just the concept that changes -the reality of nature changes too. In fact, both have evolved 
remarkably since this warning was written. At the same time, though, there remain a number of universal 
features in the socionatural relation. This fine balance has to be kept if the latter is to be explained in a 
realistic yet sophisticated fashion. 
 
 Talking about modes of habitation involves the recognition that human beings relate to their natural 
environments in different ways. In other words, every society is grounded on a particular “socioecological 
regime”, that is, on a specific type of interaction between human society and natural systems (Fischer-
Kowalski and Haberl 2007). The socionatural interaction is thus socially bounded and culturally 
constrained -otherwise it would be the same everywhere. Instead of possessing unique features 
irrespective of the time and space in which it takes place, this relation varies relatively from one social 
context to another, so that different understandings of nature co-exists, producing different patterns of 
interaction between human beings and the natural world. These patterns depend on a complex set of 
factors, including culture and history. Anthropologists and ethnographers have been especially active in 
pointing out the mediated character of the relationship between humans and nature (see Castree 1995). 
Thus the idea that nature is socially ‘constructed’, i.e. that our perception of nature determines our relation 
with it. In turn, this social condition would also mean that there is no single universal nature, because 
different contexts, cultures, social positions and historical moments will produce disparate visions of 
nature from which nature itself cannot be freed (Macnaghten and Urry 1998). Yet it is important to note 
that the social construction of nature not only involves a cultural apprehension of nature, but also a 
physical re-construction of it, a human impact in the surrounding world that never leaves nature 
unchanged (see Arias-Maldonado 2011). 
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Different socioecological regimes vary just relatively from one another. As much as an anti-essentialist 
view of nature is pertinent, lest we overlook meaningful differences between separate sociohistorical 
contexts, it can also make us forget how useful an species viewpoint can be when making sense of the 
human habitation of the world. In this regard, it would be a mistake to see the human colonization of the 
world as a choice among many, instead of taking it as the result of an universal impulse -the impulse of an 
entire species- towards survival and betterment. As Craig Dilworth (2010: 160) suggests, human tendency 
to quick adaptation to almost any situation, in having its basis in our karyotype (the complete set of 
chromosomes in our species) may itself be considered instinctual. The expression of the human species 
particular way of being involves the active transformation of the environment and the creation of its 
ecological niche (Barry 1999: 51). Human beings adapt nature by adapting it to them -ours is an aggresive 
adaptation that actively transforms the environment, thus creating new possibilities for habitation that 
were not originally 'written' in the local space we deal with. Natural limits are thus not pre-fixed: they are 
subjected to social redefinition. Needless to say, this active transformation is not always intentional, but 
often nonintentional. An unawareness that demonstrates, precisely, how niche-creation is a way of being 
rather than a choice among others. 
 
In the fields of environmental history and evolutionary theory, some approaches have taken this insight -
the human construction of its own niche- as the key explanatory factor of human development. Both 
historical ecology and niche-construction theory emphasize human transformative powers. Historical 
Ecology holds that historical rather than evolutionary events are responsible for the principal changes in 
the relation between societies and their environments: “it focuses on the interpenetration of culture and the 
environment, rather than on the adaptation of human beings to the environment” (Balée 1998: 14). It is 
fitting that landscapes are thus seen as places of interaction that bear traces of past socionatural events, a 
notion derived from cultural and historical geography (see Drenthen 2009). On its part, niche-construction 
theory refuses to subscribe to the view that organisms always adapt to their environments and never vice 
versa, recognizing instead that organisms change their environments, thus describing a dynamic, 
reciprocal interaction between the processes of natural selection and niche-construction (Laland and 
Brown 2006: 96). Tellingly, the key factor to explain this difference is the human difference: culture. 
Because, admittedly, niche-construction is a general process exhibited by all living organisms (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003). Yet human beings modify their environments mainly through cultural processes, a 
reliance that lends human niche-construction a special potency (see Smith 2007; Kendal et al. 2010). 
Cultural niche-construction is that in which learned and socially transmitted behavior modifies 
environments, amplifying the evolutionary feedback loop generated by biological niche-construction. 
 
Human beings are specially effective niche constructors due to their exceptional capacity for generating 
culture. Habitation can thus be seen as the result of an ongoing adaptation based upon the transformation 
of a given environment as influenced by the culture inherited and generated during that very process. 
Likewise, the unfolding of a historical dualism that separates nature and society may be explained 
resorting to this view of human adaptation: it is the human species way of being what gradually sets it 
apart from the natural world wherefrom it has emerged. Dualism is not an ontological condition, but a an 
emergent feature: a product of history that is real but also produces its own 'ideology'. Giorgio Agamben 
(2004) has referred to the "anthropological machine of humanism", that is, a "fundamental meta- physico-
political" device that contributes to human self-understanding in opposition to nature. The idea that human 
beings are separated from the rest of nature would thus be one of the "fictions" that, functional to human 
evolution, have punctuated their cultural history -having fictions and sharing them being precisely, as 
Harari (2011) claims, the human exception. But fictions are understood by Harari as beliefs in non-
material realities, such as the human right to a sound environment, not as 'lies'. In fact, human/nature 
dualism is a reality. Material and cultural processes such as the functional separation between the urban 
and the rural life, or the increasingly strong symbolic opposition between the rational productive activity 
and the natural world have made real a separation of something that was not separated in the beginning 
(Stephens 2000: 277). Moreover, this separation helps us to explain the potential contrast between ideals 
and modes of habitation, as well as possible gaps between the latter and habitability itself. What we think 
does not always reflect what we do. 
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Be that as it may, the rise of the Anthropocene hypothesis -based on a number of factual evidences about 
the current state of socionatural relations (see Ellis and Trachtenberg 2013)- is an important reminder of 
the need to take niche-construction into account. In this vein, Isendahl (2010) has aptly suggested that the 
Anthropocene forces us to reconsider adaptationist models of human-environment interactions, so that 
transformative human agency leads to new epistemological premises for the study of the latter. This 
recognition has also relevant implications for any politics of habitation, since those transformative powers 
are also the key to any realistic solution for the socionatural relation. 
 
However, this framework for understanding habitation is not complete unless environmental agency itself 
is taken into account. A shift towards transformative human agency runs the risk of neglecting both the 
constraints that environmental conditions impose on human adaptation and the more subtle ways in which 
the socionatural interaction creates novelties we have not fully intended. Under this light, nature is an 
unconscious but active agent that conditions human development, as much as is conditioned by social 
forces. As Edmund Russell (2011) has shown, there is actually a co-evolution of humanity and nature, 
according to which social forces have been evolutionary forces and anthropogenic (natural) evolution has 
been a social force. The climate is exemplary as a natural constraint that conditions and shapes human 
transformative adaptation: the human answer will vary under different climates. Still, perfectly-
conditioned houses can now be found in freezing as well as in suffocating environments, a proof of human 
ingenuity as much as of the gradual convergence of human adaptive techniques. Likewise, humanity 
altered global climate without knowing so and now is forced to adapt to such alteration. Aspects of the 
natural environment more amenable to conscious transformation than the climate, like mountains or rivers, 
have been unashamedly transformed by human agency -yet those changes have produced unintended 
and/or unforeseen side-effects now summed up in the Anthropocene hypothesis. 
 
One of the main implications that this approach entails for habitation vis-à-vis habitability is the need to 
carefully distinguish between intentional and nonintentional aspects of habitation. In many respects, the 
latter looks less the product of a conscious decision that an emergent order that is humanly created but not 
designed. This idea resembles that of the "spontaneous orders" championed by liberal epistemology, a 
"social intelligence" that stems from an unguided rationality (see Hayek 2008, Foster 2008). To sum it up: 
human species way of being involves an aggressive adaptation to the environment that is tantamount to an 
active transformation of it from which different modes of habitation in different sociohistorial contexts 
result. At the same time, an evolving body of knowledge about what nature is and a set of changing beliefs 
about how should we relate to it does also emerge hand in hand with that active -material- transformation. 
Such beliefs include ideals of habitation that may or may not properly correspond to the actual modes of 
habitation. But crucially, despite observable differences that reflect disparate sociohistorical conditions, 
human aggressive adaptation to the environment is not a choice but a trait of the species. This means that 
there is an unavalaible aspect of habitation: local differences do not amount to the lack of an universal 
socionatural relation. However, the opposite of a choice is not always a conscious decision: many features 
of that relation are the product of subtle reciprocal influences between human beings and nature or the 
unintended side-effects of human actions. 
 
Needless to say, this lack of awareness is more acute the deeper we go back into the past of the species. 
Now that the socionatural relation is becoming more reflective, amid the growing voices calling for its 
reorganization, a careful distinction between intentional and nonintentional human agency is in order, 
together with the recognition that ecological limits can be socially redefined and expanded -so that there is 
nothing like a 'correct' mode of habitation, nor a pre-fixed set of habitability standards. Therefore, if we 
accept the flexible nature of the socionatural relation, the key to habitation and habitability lies not in each 
of them separatedly, nor, either, in the match or mis-match between a particular mode of habitation and its 
supposedly 'fixed' habitability conditions, but in the relation between a given mode of habitation and the 
habitability conditions that are thought to be appropriate for it. Of course, there is a problem wherever a 
particular mode of habitation is not supported by the habitability of a given environment. But the latter can 
also be re-arranged by human transformative agency. 
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3. Ideals of habitation: from ideology to fantasy. 
 
In this complex and multi-layered approach to habitation, culture plays an important role as a gigantic 
repository of information that can be transmitted between and across generations: an ever-growing body 
of knowledge that makes possible the human colonization of nature. However, culture performs other 
functions in relation with nature. It provides us with values, assumptions, images that condition our 
individual perception of that complex entity that nature is. Moreover, there is no overarching consensus 
about what nature means or about how human beings should relate to it: culture is also a battlefield where 
different conceptions of nature clash. As William Cronon (1996: 52) argued in its groundbreaking study 
on the cultural readings of nature, the latter will always be a contested terrain, where the social debate 
over its different meanings takes place. In turn, each of these conceptions of nature claims its own 
legitimacy for arranging socionatural relations -producing different ideologies that justify a given 
treatment of the non-human world and result in disparate ideals of habitation. 
 
My argument is that there is a tragic gap in our increasingly global culture between the prevalent mode of 
habitation and the prevalent ideal of habitation: an instrumental usage of nature that co-exists with a 
Romantic/Arcadian view of it. Strictly speaking, this is tragic because this conundrum is ingrained in the 
species way of being and thus cannot be 'solved'. In fact, this ideal plays a role in the actual mode of 
habitation that can be explained resorting to the Lacanian/Zizekian notion of fantasy. 
 
Although Cronon himself lists a number of ways in which nature is perceived nowadays -ranging from 
nature as a moral imperative to nature as an innocent reality, a merchandise or even the return of the 
repressed-, this is not the place to ellaborate en exhaustive taxonomy of nature's embodiments in culture. 
Rather, it suffices to distinguish between two major ideologies that are radically opposed to each other and 
to some extent are the main characters in the contemporary Kampfplatz on nature: an anthropocentric view 
that affirms human exceptionality and sees nature mostly in utilitarian terms versus a Romantic or 
Arcadian view that takes nature to be a universal entity suffused with moral qualities that awaits human 
recognition and a wider socionatural reconciliation. All kind of nuances might be added, for instance those 
regarding whether nature is in the Romantic view an otherness or a continuity with humanity, or whether 
an anthropocentric understanding of nature is compatible with its protection (the answer is yes). What 
matters for my argument is that there is a clear distinction between an utilitarian and a non-utilitarian view 
of nature, each of them supported by its corresponding ideology in the weak sense of the term. Moreover, 
contemporary advanced societies combine a Romantic ideal of nature with an anthropocentric ideology, 
resulting in a tragic gap that can be rephrased as the one between an anthropocentric mode of habitation 
and a Romantic -or Arcadian- ideal of habitation. Or, at least, a mode of habitation that is pervaded by 
such ideal. In other words, we eat a steak made of industrially processed meat and then wander through 
the fields waiting for the sunset. Or we wish to have a Häuschen im Grünen, as the Germans put it, 
namely a suburbian house where nature is 'closer', but we want it with a wi-fi connection and a SUV-
vehicle parked in the door. 
 
Ironically, the Romantic or Arcadian tradition of thought is grounded precisely in the claim that nature is 
defined by the absence of the social. Hence the call to limit the human impact on the natural world. 
Although this tradition can be found wherever human beings have evoked a non-utilitarian view of nature, 
it was strongly reinforced by the Romantic notion of the sublime, that is, a view of nature as a frightening 
but inspiring entity that is not easily reduced to a positivistic, rational terms. The ultimate expression of 
this line of thought is the wilderness, namely, that part of the natural world that remains untouched by 
human beings. Of course, the wilderness is also a cultural construction, since the idea of a nature that does 
not interact with humans is in itself far from ‘natural’. Thinkers like Henry Thoureau and Aldo Leopold 
described their solitary experiences in the wilderness as being witnesses of an ever-changing but stable 
natural world full of creatures living separated from us. They all shared the feeling that human beings 
must preserve natural beings and ecosystems, embracing a “land ethic” that makes the former a member of 
the natural community rather than its conqueror (Leopold 1987). Some strands of environmentalism, like 
deep ecology, have continued a tradition that encourages an individual shift of attitude towards the natural 
world after a direct encounter with it. 
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Admittedly, cultural differences are strongly at play here, since the cultivated garden of Europe offers a 
very different experience of nature than the American wild. And even within the ample category of the 
wilderness some differences can be found -for instance between an Edenic narrative associated with the 
wilderness itself and the more ruthlessly Darwinian image attached to the jungle (see Slater 1996). Yet it 
is interesting to note that the discovery of the American wilderness helped to create a "culture of 
exuberance" that has been a fundamental part of Western modernity until recently, helping to propel the 
belief in nature's endless wealth (Catton 1980). Now, this could be taken as an ideological construction 
that supports a mode of habitation that, in turn, compromises the habitability of a given socioecological 
space in the long run. But as we saw earlier, this 'habitability' is not a given, so that the "overshoot" 
denounced by Catton himself has failed to materialize despite continuous warnings on the part of 
environmentalists. That is why the cultural and political battle to fight consists less in emphasizing the gap 
between habitation and habitability (the former supposedly threatening the latter) and more in pointing out 
the the one between prevailing modes of habitation and implicit ideals of habitation: i.e. the contradiction 
between our cultural appreciation of a romanticized nature and its actual colonization and exploitation. 
 
The concept of fantasy may be helpful to understand this peculiar dynamics. I am referring to the 
Lacanian-cum-Zizekian reading, where fantasy performs a vital function in mediating the subject's relation 
with reality. As Zizek (1989) explains, Lacan's thesis is that in the opposition between dream and reality, 
fantasy is on the side of reality, actually giving consistency to it. This happens beacuse our desire, that is 
always a neurotic one, is structured by the promise of recovering what we have lost (in Freudian terms, a 
satisfying relationship with the mother). This chimerical object of fantasy materializes the void of our 
desire and structures it, resisting interpretation: 
 
"The usual definition of fantasy ('an imagined scenario representing the realization of desire') is therefore somewhat 
misleading, or at least ambiguous: in the fantasy-scene the desire is not fulfilled, 'satisfied', but constituted (given its 
objects, and so on) -through fantasy, we learn 'how to desire'" (Zizek 1989: 118). 
 
As the Slovenian philosopher puts it, the question to be answered is how does a given empirical object 
become an object of desire. That is, how does it begin to contain some X, some unknown quality, 
something which is 'in it more than it' that makes it worthy of our desire? The answer: by entering the 
realm of fantasy. Remember Lacan's dictum that 'there is no sexual relationship': this impossibility is filled 
out by fantasy, that becomes a fantasy of the sexual relationship, a staging of it. Therefore: 
 
"There is nothing 'behind' the fantasy; the fantasy is a construction whose function is to hide this void, this 'nothing' -
that is, the lack in the Other (Zizek 1989: 133)". 
 
This in turn means that reality is simultaneously both the hard kernel resisting symbolization and a pure 
chimerical entity which has in itself no ontological consistency -a product of our fantasy. Yet it is through 
fantasy that we live, that we endure reality. Fantasy is the object of desire that keeps our desire alive, the 
paradoxical missing presence that remains latent within us, mediating in our relation with the real. 
 
As it happens, this theoretical framework can be usefully applied to the socionatural relation and, in 
particular, to the contrast between modes and ideals of habitation. Moreover, it may help to understand 
how the transition between the aforementioned culture of natural wealth and the end of nature is possible 
without major social traumas. As Fredrick Buell puts it, environmental crisis has become part of people's 
normality: 
 
"Environmental crisis is no longer an apocalypse rushing toward a herd of sheep that a few prophets are trying to 
rouse. It is not a matter of the inminent future but a feature of the present" (Buell 2004: 76).  
 
Such is the real, whereas nature is the fantasy. In other words, there is a coexistence of the 
dualistic/anthropocentric/utilitarian ideology that defines our prevailing modes of habitation (whose 
ultimate driver is the human species way of being) and the fantasy of a Romantic/Arcadian/harmonious 
nature that we embrace as a phantasmatic object of desire. Because nature is absent. As Kate Soper (2011) 
recently noted, our increased powers over it have left us 'alone': at the mercy of culture and economic and 
social policies rather than subjected to biological dictates. Moreover, the gradual disappearance of 
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alternative socionatural regimes -those that rely less strongly upon the human colonization of the natural 
world- confirms that such colonization is less a choice than a consequence of the species way of being. Or: 
the gradual convergence of different societies around a set of values, practices and technologies that 
loosely constitute the 'Western' worldview -a convergence greatly intensified by the recent wave of 
globalization and by the digiticization that reinforces it- is eroding slowly any regional or local 
'particularity'. Hence the greater distance between ideology and fantasy. 
 
A global socionatural relation is thus emerging, as the Anthropocene itself demonstrates. Still, two levels 
of occurrence and analysis can be distinguished. On the one hand, the universal fact of human adaptation 
to nature, which, despite symbiotic and cooperative practices, mostly adopts the form of a culturally 
turbocharged niche-construction that is tantamount to the social re-construction of nature. On the other, 
the particular facts of a context-bound process of adaptation that (still) reflects local peculiarities and thus 
produces a relative variability in socionatural patterns of interaction. At this latter level, different ideals of 
habitation can make a difference -by influencing current modes of habitation. To such end, habitation 
itself must be politicized, so that the gap between reality and fantasy is exposed and acknowledged. 
 
4. Politicizing habitation. 
 
Politicizing habitation means making modes of habitation salient enough, so that citizens can become 
aware of the fact that societies do have modes of habitation that involve a particular treatment of the non-
human world and a particular way of exploiting natural resources. A mode of habitation can undermine 
the habitability of a society if it ceases to be sustainable in relation to the conditions that a given 
environment impose. In principle, that is the main reason for politicizing this question -together with 
moral issues concerning the treatment of non-human beings. 
 
However, there is an important question to be made, namely: what if that habitability is not, after all, 
threatened? What if a society produces the necessary technological innovations to conjure up this danger 
or adapts to the changes that befall it without substantially changing its prevailing mode of habitation? In 
such a case, there are reasons to expect that making habitation salient would still be useful. For one thing, 
this operation looks like a promising program for devising a micropolitics of nature in the Anthropocene. 
This politicization seeks to create an awareness of the fact of habitation, that is, the very fact that societies 
are inhabited in a certain way, apparently reflecting particular ideals of habitation. Ideally, once they see 
this, citizens can choose between different modes of habitation -including the existing one. 
 
Interestingly, as has just been emphasized, much as there exists a permanent gap between expressed 
values and actual behaviors in the environmental realm, a societal gap is also observable in the contrast 
between prevalent modes of habitation in the developed world and its pervasive ideals of habitation. Most 
people still hold a Romantic view of nature either as a wilderness to be in touch with or as a garden where 
is worthwhile living -or both. Yet we live in a hypertechnological society where natural resources are 
methodically exploited and biodiversity is plummeting. This contradiction should also be made salient, in 
what clearly constitutes a political task. 
 
Laclau's (1990) conception of the political can be helpful in this context. He dwells on Husserl to make a 
distinction between the social and the political: the former consists in forgetting the acts or decisions of 
"originary institution" of the social order, whereas the latter requires the reactivation of the contingent 
moment of foundation, thus disclosing the potential for different constructions of that order. Social 
structures and collective norms are sedimented and thus taken as 'natural'; the political reveals them as 
contingent. For Laclau, the frontier between the social and the political is essentially unstable. It requires 
constant displacements and renegotiations between social agents that seeks to 'naturalize' their preferred 
social order. The ensuing conflict can take many forms -from collective mobilization to framing battles in 
the public sphere, from electoral competition to social upheavals. He is thus giving an explicit political 
meaning to genealogies, in the Nietzschean sense: researching the true origins of social norms and 
practices (Nietzsche 1988). In his own words: 
 
"To reveal the original meaning of an act, then, is to reveal the moment of its radical contingency – in other words, to 
reinsert it in the system of real historic options that were discarded (...) by showing the terrain of original violence, of 
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the power relation through which that instituting act took place" (Laclau 1990: 34). 
 
It is thus an unveiling operation that can shed light on current social configurations. Actually, that is what 
both environmental historians and philosophers have been doing over the last decades: offering an 
alternative view on how human beings have related themselves to nature (e.g. Merchant 1983, Plumwood 
1993). Theirs is also a political position, one that is challenged by critics both outside and inside the field 
of environmental studies. Yet a genealogy of habitation in the Anthropocene should go beyond the 
classical green framing -according to which human beings have alienated themselves from nature by 
dominating it- in order to explain in a realistic fashion why and how the current modes of habitation are 
firmly in place and why are they so different from the Romantic ideals of habitation that pervade Western 
cultures. Most importantly, as already explained, such a research program should try to differentiate 
between contingent and non-contingent elements of the socionatural relation, thus parting ways with 
Laclau in that not everything is deemed contingent and thus 'elective'. 
 
Developing a genealogy of habitation thus involves the recognition that human adaptation is not a choice 
but rather a necessity, as well as identifying those aspects of human adaptation to the environment that 
could not have been much different (dominating other species, exploiting natural resources, migrating to 
other territories, and so on). In sum, there is a nonintentional side to habitation that must be emphasized, 
so that alternative ideals of it -as it is the case with the Romantic or Arcadian one- do not become utopias 
whose practical implementation remains unfeasible despite their strong cultural presence. If, as Sloterdijk 
(2010: 60) claims, a genealogical investigation allows us to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' origins, a 
genealogy of habitation in the Anthropocene must be careful in identifying pure contigencies from bare 
necessities within socionatural history. All the more since, as I have argued elsewhere (see Arias-
Maldonado 2014), a feeling of pity towards the natural world can be encouraged if the human species is 
also able to develop the same feeling towards itself, by considering its own past -a past of aggression 
against nature- as a matter of necessity that only now, with the proper scientific, technological, and moral 
resources at hand, can be redressed. 
 
5. Strategies for a clever(er) adaptation. 
 
Nevertheless, what matter most regarding the politicization of habitation is making the latter salient, that 
is, creating a social awareness about the fact of habitation and about the gap between the prevailing modes 
of habitation and the Romantic ideal of habitation. How this can be done is, of course, a different problem. 
Two related ways are briefly sketched. 
 
On the one hand, there is ecological citizenship, widely understood. I conceive of the ecological citizen as 
someone who, possessing a changeable degree of commitment to the environmental cause, which can be 
expressed in a number of realms (the moral, the domestic, the public) in several ways, makes some kind of 
personal contribution to the achievement of some -any- form of sustainable society (Arias-Maldonado 
2012). In other words, the kind of actions that an ecological citizen can perform needs not to be explicitly 
political. It can be just a civic, domestic, or economic action -from supporting a green campaign to saving 
energy to purchasing some certain goods. These actions do have political significance, insofar as they lend 
de facto support to a particular view of sustainability, but are not forcefully political. As Neuteleers has 
suggested in connection to green lifestyles, they are a sign to policy-makers and they influence other 
people through citizen-citizen diffusion (Neuteleers 2010: 514). A lifestyle is a way of living; ecological 
citizenship is a way of behaving that ends up giving shape to certain lifestyles. Thus there can be no doubt 
that ecological citizenship does not have to be conceived in a deep moral way in order to possess political 
significance. Furthermore, the latter can be just too much for actual citizens, who are normally full of 
duties and short of time (see MacGregor 2006).  
 
Translated into the language of habitation, this means that the way in which a citizen lives her life is in 
itself a mode of habitation -a particular way of inhabiting the environment that either reflects an ideology 
or an ideal of habitation. A citizen that does not reflect upon the fact of habitation and simply lives by 
without devoting any thought to her preferred socioecological regime will not properly act as an 
ecological citizen. But those who have done so will be politicizing habitation by showing -implictly or 
explicitly and through their lifestyle, behavior, or discourse- their support for a particular ideal of 
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habitation. It is self-evident that the state itself can also make a contribution fostering a robust public 
culture that encourages a lively conversation on the subject, while narratives infused with ecological 
discourses can exert its own degree of influence in the global mass culture -the role of films, TV series, 
novels, journalistic reports, comic books and the like not to be, as Rorty (1989: xvi) himself pointed out, 
overlooked. Narrative can be stronger than theory. 
 
On the other hand, Steve Hinchliffe (2007: 165) has argued in favour of creating new "spaces for nature" 
that can be helpful in this context. The latter are not pre-existing ones, but "matters to come and things to 
be made", that is: complex and multiple spaces that emerge through complicated and heterogeneous 
practices and leads us to understand our co-dependence to, co-evolution with, and differences from 
companion species, urban wilds, rivers and others pieces of the nonhuman world. For Hinchliffe, the 
"ecologies of action" involved in these spaces pave the way for more sustainable practices. We could also 
say: for new understandings of habitation. As usual, it is not at all clear how these practices, procedures, 
and spaces can be institutionalized and connected to the political system in a meaningful way. Perhaps 
they cannot be connected at all. They are rather to be understood as belonging to the non-formal and non-
institutional realm of politics, that is, to a sphere of experience that nurtures a culture of sustainability 
loosely related to sustainability policies. That caveat notwithstanding, particular practices can be formally 
linked to particular policy procedures, so that channels of communication and influence are created 
between areas of experience and areas of decision. Designing an urban park, creating a natural park or 
reserve, protecting the nonhuman world inhabiting cities, cooperating with trekking associations when 
touristic strategies are developed, managing beaches, regulating the presence of pets in public spaces, 
fostering the cultivation of gardens in building roofs in cooperation with neighbours, setting up incentives 
for local farmers to go green, organizing educational trips for children where socionatural interactions 
rather than a separated nature are emphasized -those are some ways to foster a new understanding of the 
socionatural relation at a local level and thus to produce in the long run new ideals of habitation that may 
be translated into new moralities and lifestyles. Naturally, more deep and isolated ecological practices will 
continue to take place separated from any institutional realm, contributing in a less conspicuous manner to 
cultural change. 
 
These spaces for nature are to encourage the transition away from the aggresive adaptation that has served 
our species well in the past, allowing us to grow and thrive at the expense of the nonhuman world, 
replacing it with a clever adaptation that combines a more sophisticated exploitation of the environment 
with a more caring attitude towards the natural environment. Whereas the former demands directing 
sustainability towards hybridization, an intensive use of technology, and a high degree of substitutability 
between natural and man-made or cultivated capital, the latter should be encouraged within entangled 
communities where human beings learn to perceive the non-human world in a different way -provided that 
they also have the chance to relate to it differently without seeing their well-being diminished for that 
reason. 
 
Needless to say, those entangled communities should be mostly urban, since the share of the global 
population living in cities is already bigger than that of country-dwellers. In fact, there have always 
existed multispecies communities. Yet the challenge for the Anthropocene is to create non-wild 
multispecies communities: not the farm but the neighborhood. People's attention must be turned to the 
presence and role of the nonhuman world in our twenty-first century urban lives. As White recalls, "hybrid 
landscapes are where we spend our lives" (White 2004: 8). A city that engages with its mundane nature 
could evolve to a place less single-mindedly wedded to the nature/culture duality (Newman and Dale 
2013). This includes urban and domestic vegetation as much as pets, but also the more hidden fauna that 
lives in the interstices of cities, resources such as water and air, and naturally food. These are spaces 
where habitation itself is shaped, and hence where it can be reshaped as well. 
 
6. Reframing habitation: towards an ecological enlightenment. 
 
But where should this politicization lead to? Which is the best way to foster a new understanding of 
socionatural relations that begins by reframing habitation and ideally makes it possible to reorganize them 
in a more sustainable and caring way? How does a realistic ideal of habitation look like? I will briefly 
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sketch the position that I take to be more promising -one that is both realistic and transformative. But I 
will do that by contrasting it to what might be deemed the most radical habitability theory to have ever 
emerged within environmentalism, namely, bioregionalism. 
 
Bioregionalism is interesting because it actually is a theory of habitability. Rooted in the Counterculture of 
the 60s, inspired by the aboriginal Indians' relationship with the environment as much as by an outright 
refusal of industrial society, bioregionalism seeks to change the way human beings inhabit the land. 
Habitation, dwelling, place -those are the key bioregionalist concepts. As Berg and Dasmann (1977: 399) 
put it, human beings must learn to reinhabit the land, ceasing to be their exploiters and becoming natives: 
full members of the biotic community. This land is a bioregion, defined by Kirkpatrick Sale, the most 
prominent bioregional thinker, as 
 
"a life-territory, a place defined by its life forms, its topography and its biota, rather than by human dictates; a region 
governed by nature, not legislature" (Sale 1985: 2). 
 
Natural sciences may help to define the way in which a bioregion should be inhabited, but it is those who 
actually live in it -Sale's "dwellers in the land"- the ones that possess a proper knowledge of the place. 
After all, a bioregion is a geographical space and an area of consciousness (Berg and Dasmann 1977: 23). 
As a matter of fact, there is an important emotional side to bioregionalism. McGinnis (1999) alludes to "a 
sensual memory of the place", suggesting that by hearing the landscape we can go back to our primitive 
roots. Bioregionalism is thus more than a theory -it is a new regime of perception, a cultural revolution 
whose raison d'etre is the need to make the social order a mirror of the natural. This includes politics. 
Existing political frontiers should be replaced by "more natural" ones (Tokar 1987: 30). Sale is the thinker 
who has given more details about a hypothetical bioregional order, emphasizing that the social 
organization of each bioregion is subordinated to the local culture generated by a particular environment. 
Mainly, a bioregional order is made up of small communities whose decisions are adopted by the whole 
social body and whose economy is based upon the principle of minimum interference. Bioregionalism can 
thus be taken as deep ecology's politics (Barry 1999: 82) or as the fulfillment of Aldo Leopold's "land 
ethic" (Alexander 1990: 162). 
 
Either way, bioregionalism is a radical approach to socionatural relations that demands a very strict 
consistency between habitation and habitability. The bioregional vision implies that the ideal of habitation 
should be derived from habitability itself: a land has to be inhabited without disturbing at all its ecological 
stability. Apparently, then, there can be no gap between modes of habitation and habitability conditions: 
there is no place for fantasy in this socioecological regime. Needless to say, this radical vision is 
inherently flawed for reasons that have already been explained above -when the universal, non-contingent 
features of the socionatural relation have been pointed out. 
 
To begin with, are we not dwellers in the land too? As it happens, contemporary citizens mostly live in 
lands that have been transformed throughout history in an ultimately 'natural' way: as an expression of the 
species way of being. When Sale (1985: 59) suggests that those who live in a bioregion are the ones who 
really know about it, he relies upon a conditional definition of culture: from the bioregionalist point of 
view, only a culture that embeds human beings in nature is a valid one. Within that framework, particular 
bioregions will produce different cultures and ideological systems (Atkinson 1991: 196). Natural diversity 
is thus expected to produce social diversity, as opposed to a view where the interaction between different 
environments and a human universal impulse produces such diversity -before a single model, the current 
one, begins to be globally prevalent. In short, bioregions are presented in each case as something given, 
instead of being recognized as a something constructed (Harvey 1996: 202). Natural conditions are just 
one element in a complex sociohistorical process where human transformative process are bound to play a 
more significant role than 'natural' conditions. After all, bioregionalism seems naïvely influenced by the 
bountiful image of nature characteristic of the American tradition: a bioregion poor in resources could 
hardly fulfill basic needs (Roussopoulos 1993: 78). Actually, this environmental determinism should be 
understood in a normative way: bioregionalism suggests that human culture and society ought to be 
modelled after the natural environment they are surrounded by. This ideal of habitation should determine 
each mode of habitation -the ideal itself relying on habitability conditions that are taken as pre-fixed and 
not amenable to social correction. 
Manuel Arias-Maldonado 12 
 
However, bioregionalism has also been subjected to an internal critique that acknowledges human agency 
and opens up transformative possibilities. Departing from the natural features of a given bioregion, Flores 
(1999: 48-49) concedes, human beings do have a responsability in shaping places, due to their 
technological ability and to the role of ideology. In other words, because of culture. This non-scientific 
version of bioregionalism might thus be seen rather as a sensitivity that takes into account the influence 
that natural regions exert over cultural geographies, adopting a dialectical approach that points toward a 
greater ecological awareness and a more respectful socionatural interaction (see Alexander 1990: 172-
173). This is certainly a more becoming formula. 
 
In this regard, leaving aside the many flaws inherent in the bioregionalist vision, it is important to keep in 
mind that green post-industrial utopianism has not worked in the public arena. Although the rise of climate 
change has reinvigorated ecological dystopianism -the other side of any eco-utopia-, the public does not 
seem more inclined to shift towards post-capitalistic values than it was forty years ago. As Anderson 
(2010) has pointed out, environmentalism has become a zombie category partly because green theorists go 
against the tide of a pro-consumption and pro-development culture that is conspicuous in advanced 
economies and increasingly prevalent in the emerging ones. Witness the recent debate between journalists 
Naomi Klein and Elizabeth Kolbert: in her latest book, Klein (2014) claims that society must be saved 
from capitalism, while Kolbert (2014, 2015) accuses Klein of hiding the real consequences of such radical 
shift -for the simple reason that the public shy away when they are explained to them. 
 
Yet the problem does not only concern self-presentation. An Anthropocene-friendly environmentalism 
should acknowledge that nature and society are not, nor have ever been and neither will be, separate 
entities. Moreover, the human colonization of the environment is the reason why human beings have 
thrived -up to a point where caring for the environment has emerged as a social concern in the first place. 
Needless to say, classical environmentalism has made a great contribution to the recognition of nature's 
value, but the former could have never succeed in a society where basic needs had not been previously 
fulfilled. As Nordhaus and Shellenberg, notorious critics of classical environmentalism, put it: 
 
"The apocalyptic vision of ecotheology warns that degrading nonhuman natures will undermine the basis for human 
civilization, but history has shown the opposite: the degradation of nonhuman environments has made us rich. We 
have become rather adept at transferring the wealth and diversity of nonhuman environments into human ones. The 
solution to the unintended consequences of modernity is, and has always been, more modernity -just as the solution 
to the unintended consequences of our technologies has always been more technology" (Nordhaus and Shellenberg, 
2011: 13). 
 
No matter how seductive for its defendats they may be, de-growth strategies have a limited appeal among 
those social groups whose support is necessary for achieving global sustainability. The best way ahead for 
environmentalism is arguably a defence of eco-modernization combined with a vindication of nature's 
value, albeit in a non-essentialist way: a hybrid nature that is part of a complex, multi-layered, 
increasingly mixed-up socionatural entanglement. Distinguishing himself between environmentalists and 
postenvironmentalists, Latour puts it his way: 
 
"Environmentalists say: 'From now on we should limit ourselves'. Postenvironmentalists exclaim: 'From now on, we 
should stop flagellating ourselves and take up explicitly and seriously what we have been doing all along at an ever-
increasing scale, namely, intervening, acting, wanting, caring'" (Latour 2011: 21; my emphasis). 
 
In this vein, Symons and Karlsson (2015) make an important point, suggesting that the task of nurturing 
green subjectivities should be freed from the burden of saving the planet and rather advocated for its 
intrinsic worth. In the language of the habitation approach, modes of habitation should be disentangled 
from the habitability imperative -provided that the former are reasonable rather than delirious. New ideals 
of habitation are to be fostered, instead of just recovering the limits discourse. To do this, a 
Romantic/Arcadian perspective is not promising, unless new ways of romanticizing nature can be found. 
This is not impossible, especially in connection to animals and landscapes. In any case, as Anderson 
suggests, environmentalist practices and selves should no longer be "secluded at one pole of a binary 
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positioning, but regain their connection to the range of practices and identities we action and inhabit in the 
course of our everyday lives" (Anderson 2010: 984). 
 
Habitability, in sum, must be secured by means other than the straightforward moralization of the 
socionatural relation. Such means are those of eco-modernization. Meantime, a more caring attitude 
towards the nonhuman world and a greater recognition of nonhuman subjectivities will likely grow in the 
interstices of the political space so created. As strong moral sacrificies for the sake of the environment are 
not likely, other incentives have to be created, so that caring for nature does not involve a dramatic 
lessening of material well-being. An ecological ethics that we can afford: that is a feasible program for the 
moralization of the Anthropocene. If this sounds cynical, it is because it tries to be realistic. 
 
If a reframing of habitation is to be achieved, a more enticing narrative for environmentalism -or for 
sustainability beyond environmentalism- is needed. This is how new ideals of habitation can be produced, 
which in turn will influence modes of habitation, i.e. socionatural practices. On the contrary, the limits 
supposedly posed by habitability should not be used for calling into question current modes of habitation. 
Rather, this debate should be conducted as a debate on the good life, so that differences between different 
ideals and modes of habitation are singled out. To such end, the richness of the human species should be 
emphasized -a richness that is material as much as it is intellectual (see Kersten 2013). New possibilities 
for defining the good life and engaging creatively with the socionatural entanglement should be looked 
for. In this context, the Anthropocene is an opportunity to reframe the conversation on the good society, 
thus making it the driver for an ecological enlightenment. Such is the meaning of the "ecological 
receptivity" advocated by Schlosberg (2013), involving a new human disposition towards the nonhuman 
world. A similar path is taken by Andreas Weber (2014), who advocates an "erotic ecology" that 
reconnects human beings with nature. As the German Advisory Council on Global Change argues, such 
global transformations cannot be grounded just on a 'planetary boundaries' perspective, but rather need to 
be rooted in an 'open frontiers' narrative that emphasizes alternative ways of living (WBGU 2011: 84). In 
this context, environmentalism might be seen as the enlightening agent that continues -and brings further- 
the task of modernity (Radkau 2011). Politicizing habitation is one of the ways in which this agenda can 
be advanced. 
 
7. Conclusion. 
 
This paper has meditated on the related notions of habitation and habitability, distinguishing mostly 
between modes and ideals of habitation: the way in which an environment is inhabited and the normative 
blueprint of the way in which it should be inhabited. To that a third notion can be added, namely, 
ideologies associated to particular modes of habitation: sets of values, narratives and practices that 
legitimize particular modes of inhabiting a place. In this vein, it has been argued that a critique of 
habitation that relies upon the potential mismatch with habitability conditions is rather flawed, since 
ecological limits are not natural nor pre-fixed, but rather a socially defined boundary that -as it has often 
been the case- can be newly organized through human discoveries or innovations. For that reason, the 
most interesting strategy is to emphasize the existing gap between prevailing modes of habitation and the 
ideals supporting them. Romantic views of nature are thus unveiled as a fantasy that indirectly legitimize a 
rather anthropocentric-cum-instrumental usage of nature. Now, this gap is likely to be unavoidable. As 
this paper has shown, adopting a species perspective allows us to acknowledge that the human way of 
being involves an aggressive adaptation to the environment that actually transforms it -as opposed to the 
idea that humans simply adapt themselves to it. Therefore, human colonization of nature is not a choice, 
but a necessity that has been carried out universally, albeit with local differences. The latter, however, 
tend to be blurred as economic and cultural globalization (reinforced buy digitizacion) further extends the 
'Western' socioecological regime.  
 
In this context, to question modes of habitation means politicizing them. This, in turn, involves making 
them salient, so that citizens realize that there are particular societal choices defining the way in which 
they relate to their environments. A genealogy of habitation that traces back socionatural history makes it 
thus possible to distinguish between contingent and non-contingent features of habitation. A radical way 
of politicizing habitation that just misses this point is bioregionalism, according to which there is a natural 
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mode of habitation that involve the most light human adaptation to the environments. On the contrary, 
especially in view of the continuing failure of the limits discourse to engage the middle classes, an eco-
modernist approach that seeks to refine the human control of nature instead of relinquishing it seems more 
promising as a framework for discussing habitation. This will not 'liberate' nature, but it will protect the 
remaining natural forms in the context of a highly technological world that is rapidly in the making. This 
is how modes of habitation should be reframed -by producing new ideals of habitation inspired by an 
ecological enlightenment associated with the rise of the Anthropocene. Ecological citizenship and the 
creation of multispecies communities and spaces for nature in urban contexts have been explored as ways 
to promote a new awareness of the fact of habitation.  
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